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ABSTRACT
Hyperconnected societies offer new opportunities for the role of the 
individual voice. A deregulated world of information poses a paradox, 
however, in which fake news might conceivably underpin the poli-
tical agenda more than informed research. The sheer amount of 
information available forces publics and audience members to seek 
shortcuts to knowledge through access to preferred academic, public 
intellectual or ‘thought leader’ perspectives. Drawing upon theories 
of deliberative democracy and open communication, this paper 
critiques the roles of academic, public intellectual and thought leader 
to move beyond discussion of the value of individual voices in the 
sharing of knowledge. It suggests that both public intellectuals and 
thought leaders illuminate how the individual voice makes an impor-
tant contribution in providing continuity when open communication 








In responding to the idea of ‘Future-proofing communication at the academy-societal 
interface’, this paper responds to a significant challenge. Academics in a deregulated 
world of information cannot help but acknowledge that fake news might conceivably 
underpin more of the political agenda than informed research (Lazer et al., 2018). ‘Share 
of knowledge’ is not reflected in ‘share of voice’ and even less connected to ‘share of power’.
The work of the public intellectual in synthesising and popularising the findings of 
rigorous research has never been more important (Dahlgren, 2012). In an information- 
saturated world, publics and audience members seek shortcuts to knowledge. An estab-
lished personal brand becomes part of a speaker’s credibility (for example, Mary Beard, 
or Brian Cox), while imprimaturs of quality and effectiveness (Nobel prizes, Uber, 
Extinction Rebellion) indicate to wider publics the thinkers, the changes, and the move-
ments to which they should be paying attention (Brint, 2020; Elshtain, 2014).
The challenge for informed voices seeking to cut through the clamour may appear 
overwhelming. Being an internet sensation requires a different skillset from rigorous 
investigation and analysis (Abidin, 2018; Livingstone & Helsper, 2010). Paradoxically, 
digital cut-through may also reflect support from legacy media (as with Beard and Cox).
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Yet the social interface of education continues to be crucial, and longstanding commu-
nication research around societal interfaces, from the 2-step flow of information and 
opinion leadership (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955) through to networked knowledge-sharing 
and social capital (Lefebvre, Sorenson, Henchion, & Gellynck, 2016), help explain the role 
of new knowledge champions. Chief among these, in 2019–20, is Greta Thunberg (Kühne, 
2019). Her repeated call to ‘listen to scientists’ (Milman & Smith, 2019) indicates that even 
as the public sphere becomes more amorphous and diffuse, a clear message spoken 
authoritatively can galvanise the future and rehabilitate the academy (Thunberg, 2019).
This paper responds to a provocation that suggests the academy will become precar-
ious as a result of open science empowering individual citizens and democratising 
knowledge. That provocation intimates that, while the academy may still have relevance 
as an organisation that creates, curates and communicates knowledge, the public may not 
recognise that relevance and may choose not to connect with the expertise it implies. This 
paper contributes to the debate by highlighting threads of continuity evident in aspects of 
the hyperconnected global communication environment while also acknowledging that 
dynamic change operates as a driving force for disruption. The argument advanced is 
that futureproofing the links between academy and society rests in a continuing commit-
ment to robust, persuasive research that has the capacity to inspire and influence key 
social actors. The important contributions made by public intellectuals and thought 
leaders illuminate the value of the individual voice in providing continuity when unruly 
speakers and publics disrupt the open communication of research.
Deliberative democracies and ‘information shortcuts’
The paper starts with the position that the individual voice is important, and nowhere 
more so than for those people whose good fortune it is to live in the deliberative 
democracies that characterise the world’s free market economies. In fact, the aspiratory 
ideals underpinning Western liberal democracies cannot be completely achieved but 
offer standards to strive for and empirical suggestions for how political processes might 
work better (Bächtiger, Dryzek, Mansbridge, & Warren, 2018).
Deliberative democracies are jointly constituted both by democracy and by deliberation. 
Indeed the democratic process, in the words of Kim, Wyatt and Katz, occurs when ‘citizens 
voluntarily and freely participate in discussions on public issues, [and is] a discursive 
system where citizens share information about public affairs, talk politics, form opinions 
and participate in political processes’ (1999, p. 361). An effective, working, deliberative 
democracy demands, and always has demanded, access to relevant quality information and 
a citizenry capable of discerning both the relevance and the quality of the information they 
encounter.
The exchanges about public affairs that take place between ordinary people are vitally 
important for a ‘talk-centric democracy’ (Chambers, 2003). Major studies highlight the role 
of individual voices and personal influence in mini-publics (Huckfeldt, Johnson, & 
Sprague, 2004). They are accorded the function of connecting the private realm of people’s 
everyday lifeworlds with the public sphere and ultimately the institutions of governance 
and the processes of decision-making which take place within these (Chambers, 2012; 
Habermas, 1996). On the one hand, informal conversations provide opportunities for 
informal information from everyday discussions to contribute to formal public discussions 
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by empowering citizens’ participation in political debate. On the other hand, informal 
political chats within social networks motivate participation in the affairs of the day, and 
improve skills for public discussion (Schmitt-Beck & Grill, 2020).
The promise of the diversity and inclusion of deliberative democracy is a strong fit for 
the hyperconnected complexity of the contemporary world (Chambers & Gastil, 2020). 
Boulianne (2009, 2016) suggests that the digital environment offers a more deliberative 
democracy and potentially shapes change in political engagement and participation. 
Chen (2020) believes that a deliberative process can foster ordinary citizens’ thoughtful 
discussions on well-being issues. It can also increase civic participation in community 
development (Boulianne, Chen, & Kahane, 2020).
In political systems, some citizens are relatively more influential within the networks of 
communication connecting individuals to one another. ‘Public intellectuals’ and thought 
leaders are such persons of influence in opinion formation. The established notion of public 
intellectual is reflected in Russell Jacoby’s 1987 definition of the term. He deemed it to mean 
‘writers and thinkers who address a general and educated audience’ (Jacoby, 1987, p. 5). 
Drezner (2017) points out that today’s intellectuals have been facilitated by three factors: 
the evaporation of public confidence in institutions, the polarisation of society, and 
increasing economic inequality. The last factor is also the most important factor, according 
to Drezner (2017), empowering a new kind of public intellectual. Among thought leaders, 
the most effective are both experts and activists who carry particular weight in the collective 
deliberations of democratic systems. This weighting system results from the continuing 
stream of social interactions between citizens (Ahn, Huckfeldt, & Ryan, 2014).
Considering the role of the media, Dahlgren (2002) identifies four elements contributing 
to public involvement in politics prior to the adoption of digital networks. These are: ‘media 
exposure, talking about media output, opinion formation, and political participation’ 
(2002, p. 16). He starts with the idea that ‘media exposure is a necessary precondition for 
deliberation and the power of the voice to cut through’ (Dahlgren, 2002, p. 16). His 
argument acknowledges that media exposure helps create raw material that people use as 
they work together in social settings to form opinions around political participation. 
Dahlgren’s comment recognises the well-established agenda-setting role (Dahlgren, 2005, 
2013) traditionally performed by legacy media in its capacity to amplify the power of the 
individual voice (Dahlgren, 2012). Such a perspective echoes the role of personal influence 
in developing people’s opinions and aligns with the 2-step flow theory of information (Katz 
& Lazarsfeld, 1955). In this model, information is first judged important by opinion leaders, 
and then by those they influence. Arguably, the power of the individual voice is relevant 
both in micro communication exchanges, around the water cooler (Brewster, Croucher, 
Wood, & Brookes, 2007; Morrison, Wheeler-Smith, & Kamdar, 2011), and in global debates 
where single voices can cut through the cacophony to speak directly and authoritatively to 
a nation or generation, and across divisions of age, culture, class and religious affiliation 
(Castells, 2008; da Conceição-heldt & Meunier, 2014; Thunberg, 2019).
The hyperconnected networks of the digital world create opportunities for citizens to 
adopt ‘information shortcuts’ for making good decisions (Somin, 2016). Among many 
different types of shortcuts, publics may follow the directions of thought leaders who share 
similar values but are notable for their knowledge of public policy issues. Connectivity leads 
to a networked knowledge-sharing and social capital base (Lefebvre et al., 2016), helping 
explain the role of knowledge champions as providing information shortcuts. Over time 
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people come to trust that a specific speaker will deliver relevant, quality information, thus 
assigning credibility to the power of the individual voice.
Open access to information?
The open communication of science, and the public’s access to the fruits of academic 
labour more generally, have created opportunities for broadening the academy-societal 
interface. Academic publication models tend to lock up intellectual content behind 
paywalls that create shareholder value for publishers’ investors, instead of informing 
citizens. In addition to the people who currently read academic outputs normally needing 
their institution to pay a subscription fee, there is the added matter of the voluntary 
labour of academic peer review systems. These review activities add value and serve as 
a proxy guarantee of quality. They are usually financed as part of the relevant academic’s 
government/student funded role. The journal in which you read this article, for example, 
has a paywall and is funded via subscription, which may have been paid for by 
a university or a particularly engaged (and most likely tenured) academic, or bundled 
with an annual membership subscription to a learned association.
This model of access to the outcomes of scholarly research tends to exclude say, 
fifteen-year old schoolgirls: the age that Greta Thunberg was when she started what is 
now the School Strike for Climate campaign (Green, 2020). With government funding 
and university students’ co-payment contributions typically financing academic labour, 
and with both finance streams implying that such work should be for the public good, 
equity would suggest that academic outputs should be available to all interested citizens, 
regardless of age, and without a user-pays cost.
Equity similarly underpins the view that open access is a minimum starting point from 
which to address the systemic disadvantage impacting the global South. The majority 
world’s traditional intellectual property and productive labour have been ruthlessly 
exploited by the global North over the centuries; before, during and after colonisation. 
There are compelling reasons why academic work and evidence-based research should 
circulate freely through global social knowledge networks, offering benefit where rele-
vant. Not least of these reasons is the disproportionate impact of early manifestations of 
the climate emergency upon the global South, which has contributed least to the crisis. 
Even so, it is the South which is bearing the brunt of the social and political, as well as the 
environmental, consequences (Mitlin & Satterthwaite, 2013; Rigg, 2007). Reassuringly, 
there is evidence of a significant trend towards global access to knowledge.
In an article that provides an overview of the growing momentum of the open access 
movement, New Scientist journalist Lawton (2018) argues that the world is poised on the 
cusp of change. Noting that scientific publishing has been characterised by ‘big money, 
piracy, hacking, infighting, fake news and free speech’, mirroring the journalism/social 
media debates canvassed above, Lawton constructs the issue of open access as nothing 
less than a battle for the ‘soul of science itself’ (Lawton, 2018). He predicts that within 
10 years all publicly funded knowledge will be open for public access and able to circulate 
through debate and discussion, informing an educated and engaged citizenry (Lawton, 
2018). The move towards open scholarship and open science consequently helps reha-
bilitate the academy-societal interface whilst also allowing knowledge champions, both 
public intellectuals and thought leaders, to engage with publics around their evidence.
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The next section considers the juxtaposition of the academy and society and highlights 
both the role of personal influence (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955) and that of the individual 
voice in hyperconnected societies. Before doing this, it will consider the different roles 
and contributions of public intellectuals, thought leaders and legacy media.
Academy-societal interface in hyperconnected societies
A straightforward, but not entirely accurate depiction of the public intellectual and the 
thought leader might align the intellectual with the academy and the charismatic, but not 
necessarily qualified thought leader (Drezner, 2017) with society. Although the roles can 
be distinguished, they are not necessarily distinct and rely upon each other for maximum 
beneficial effectiveness. Ideally, the academy connects with thought leaders who arise 
from specific social contexts, but who can communicate across generations, cultures and 
continents. Through engagement, the academy has continuing relevance: even at a time 
of disruption via unruly speakers and publics. Indeed, effective movements for change 
generally include input from both thought leaders and academics.
Margaret Mead is credited with first noting that ‘a small group of thoughtful, com-
mitted citizens can change the world; indeed, it is the only thing that ever has’ (Mead, as 
quoted in Applewhite, Evans, & Frothingham, 2003, p. 69). Indeed, the Western demo-
cratic model, and the notion of free speech that it champions (Nunziato, 2009; Stone, 
2008; Warburton, 2009) entails a dynamic engagement between a group of people, and 
ideas. The capacity for an individual to motivate and be part of just such a group is 
offered as evidence for the continuing power of the individual voice. Voices that cut 
through, however, have to stand out from the crowd. Even before open communication 
of research, hyperconnectivity connects interested publics with an effectively infinite 
number of speakers, philosophies and perspectives. The links between these entities are 
so diverse and numerous that an attempt to examine them can be overwhelming. 
Unravelling is connectivity represents the core of the business model upon which 
Google and other search engines are based (Halavais, 2017; Lewandowsk, Kerkmann, 
Rümmele, & Sünkler, 2018; Vise & Malseed, 2005).
Over the past generation, information consumers (Nicholas et al., 2003) have acquired 
the power to change systems and algorithms to reflect the number of people using a system 
and the types of usage made. Indeed, citizens in Western democracies have become well 
aware that when they pay attention to content, that in and of itself creates value. Digital 
activity is tracked, recorded and monetised and people are reluctantly learning to see 
themselves as organisms that produce ‘data’ (Lupton, 2018). Additionally, the contributions 
people make in their role as ‘content creators’ (Green & Jenkins, 2014; Holton, Coddington, 
& Gil de Zúñiga, 2013) helps inform the knowledge they gain, driving the algorithmic 
determinants of others’ information feeds. The ‘likes’ and the comments (Thorson, 2014; 
Winter, Brückner, & Krämer, 2015), are homogenised and commodified with the antici-
pated outcome of delivering ‘eyeballs’ (Ju, Jeong, & Chyi, 2014; Mandiberg, 2012), or 
‘audience share’ (Papacharissi, 2007; Sullivan, 2019), to the greater good of the media 
platforms they use and the advertisers who fund it and the shareholders who reap the 
dividends. Thus, even when the western democratic/free-market model of open commu-
nication is working well, the market place for ideas is essentially one that is distorted by 
algorithms and dynamics that foster profit and relative platform advantage.
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Such distortions are routinely subject to further complications. In addition to the 
market itself, there is a range of philosophical perspectives and cultural groupings that do 
not support open knowledge and seek to undermine western information networks. One 
signal example of this is the Cambridge Analytica scandal that cost Facebook 
a (temporary but significant) drop in share value, and a large fine (Cadwalladr & 
Graham-Harrison, 2018; Isaak & Hanna, 2018; Vaidhyanathan, 2018). The scandal 
revealed Facebook’s capacity for being appropriated to spruik fake news and extremist 
views (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018; Isaak & Hanna, 2018), as well as its 
potential to contribute to social fragmentation, and ideological polarisation (DiFranzo 
& Gloria-Garcia, 2017). Following the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Vaidhyanathan 
(2018) states that ‘Facebook undermines their [the institutions’] ability to support 
healthy public deliberation. Facebook distorts the very sources of news and information 
on which a democratic republic relies’ (p.8). Such distortions increasingly speak to 
publics who embrace conspiracy theories, providing ample evidence, for those who 
don’t, that the openness of communication is being disrupted by unruly speakers and 
publics. Even so, stellar examples remain of the open communication of science cutting 
through the maelstrom and offering proof that fact can still underpin public discussion, 
countering and challenging unwarranted assertions and ill-informed speculation 
(Dennis, 2018; Lee, Choi, Kim, & Kim, 2014; Meraz, 2009; Yin, 1999).
Media and the power of the individual voice
Although digital communication channels have disrupted the ‘rivers of (advertising) 
gold’ (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [ACCC], 2019, p. 56; Flew & 
Wilding, 2020) that used to fund quality journalism, the legacy media continues to play 
a vital part in curating, gatekeeping and providing informed comment. Given that 
younger generations have lost the habit of tuning into a news programme or reading 
a newspaper, it is tempting to believe that such organisations no longer have relevance. 
This is a misconstruction. It is not that there is no ongoing need for the professional 
journalism skills that characterise legacy media output: there is. Indeed, as the ACCC 
inquiry identified, the recirculating of legacy media content is a major contributor to the 
‘stickiness’ of digital platforms, helping attract and retain their audiences (ACCC, 2019).
The issue is that while quality journalism remains needed and valued for its agenda 
setting and validation roles (McCombs, 2018; McCombs & Shaw, 2016), it has never been 
directly funded by those who need and value it. Instead it is funded by organisations 
intent on delivering ‘audiences for sale to advertisers’ (Smythe, 1977, p. 16). The 
challenge is to persuade consumers used to accessing quality content without a clear 
cost threshold that the quality content in question is worth paying for. Essentially, the 
search is on for new models to fund quality journalism while incentivising consumer- 
pays practices. The indication is that some of the innovative strategies to achieve this 
outcome are working (Albarran, 2016; Küng, 2015), partly because readers and audiences 
appreciate that journalistic practice interrogates speakers on their behalf, in order to 
inform selection of the individual voices that society should pay attention to. And this is 
where Dahlgren’s (2002) perceived role of the media in identifying and amplifying voices 
remains relevant.
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This is not to say that legacy media does not benefit from the challenges offered by the 
current chaos and anarchy evident in the free market of ideas. Glasgow Media Group 
(Eldridge, 2000; Philo, 2014) is one of a range of critical commentators that point to the 
well-established tendency of legacy media to support ‘the establishment’. Further, on 
occasion, the media put profit and shareholder value before objective truth-telling. At the 
same time, reflecting the patterns inherent in the adversarial nature of the Westminster 
model of deliberative democracy, and the prosecution and defence perspectives of the 
courts that underpin law and order in such democracies, the media has a default setting 
of enlisting speakers from the more extreme perspectives to foster public debate. 
Consensus and agreement don’t make a ‘story’, and the successful identification of 
a middle path is much less likely to inform a satisfying water cooler debate than open 
discord. Given this, the traditional patterns of privilege accruing to the legacy media have 
themselves been challenged by the digital disruptions assigned to unruly speakers and 
publics: to the benefit of deliberative democracy.
It is in this context that social media, as a specific incarnation of digital media, is 
identifying and highlighting voices that achieve break-through against a background of 
chaos and cacophony. Social media, and the platforms that support them, help informa-
tion consumers identify the sources juxtaposed to legacy media. This dynamic recognises 
that digital media is increasingly the underpinning technology for legacy media, as well as 
for social media. A case study from Vietnam, where the legacy media is under the control 
of the government, provides valuable evidence of the channels through which social 
media exerts influence on public opinion and, as a direct consequence, upon the content 
carried in legacy media (Le, 2018). In order to maintain relevance, legacy media are 
forced to acknowledge the voices and arguments highlighted by disruptive social media. 
Legacy titles cannot pretend that they alone are the arbiters of what is worth paying 
attention to when a significant proportion of citizens are engaged with and debating 
alternative voices. So how is the role of the public intellectual impacted by the different 
perspectives of the legacy media on the one hand and social media on the other?
Critiquing the roles of public intellectual and thought leader
The contest between media forms, between legacy media and social media, is a significant 
element contributing to the formation of ‘unruly speakers and publics’. It also supports 
the development of a double meaning to the term ‘public intellectual’. In traditional 
media terms, this role been reserved for established intellectuals who were willing to 
engage with the public through relevant and accessible discourse, and whose opinions are 
valued by the legacy media that championed them. Examples might include the historian, 
Mary Beard, and the physicist Brian Cox.
Mary Beard and Brian Cox, as examples, do not only have expertise in a particular 
field, but also have a talent for communicating with a wide and diverse audience. Mary 
Beard, Professor of Classics at the University of Cambridge, is more than one of the 
world’s best-known classicists. She is also widely known for ‘her interventions in public 
life [that] offer an alternative mode of discourse, one that people are hungry for: 
a position that is serious and tough in argument, but friendly and humorous in manner, 
and one that, at a time when disagreements quickly become shrill or abusive, insists on 
dialogue’ (Higgins, 2018). Meanwhile, Brian Cox, Professor of Physics at Manchester 
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University, was a pop musician with band D:Ream before focusing on a career in science. 
He is known for publicising scientific thought, theory and fact to a broad audience 
through popular science programmes and accessible publishing that targets lay readers 
such as (Cox & Forshaw, 2009) Why Does E = mc2? (And Why Should We Care?).
In digital contexts, however, a new generation of social media users has refined the 
definition of ‘public intellectual’ to identify certain individuals whose work is valued by 
sufficient numbers, groups and cross-sections of the connected global audience to be elevated 
to public prominence. This perspective aligns with the shift in focus from a traditional 
emphasis upon the intellectual element of the public intellectual as validated by the impri-
matur of the academy, to the conception of public intellectual that foregrounds the power of 
the public to claim and celebrate its own intellectuals. This dynamic, in effect, highlights the 
fact that being an intellectual is only one of the ways in which a person can be identified as 
having a powerful individual voice capable of functioning as the promoter of reason and as 
a wellspring of ideas that nurture political debate and active citizenship. It emphasises the 
public element of the public intellectual: the intellectual component is assigned importance 
because the public has decided that the content speaks to them in a direct way.
Accepting the possible contestation around whether the emphasis is placed on ‘public’ or 
on ‘intellectual’, Dahlgren (2012) nonetheless locates public intellectuals as embedded in 
‘the structural setting of mediated public spheres with a particular emphasis on the online 
sector’ (2012, p. 95). It is the many-to-many communication enabled by hyperconnectivity 
that is constructed as disrupting the orderly advance of political ideas. While it is eminently 
arguable as to whether such order ever truly existed, even in the pre-internet era, Dahlgren’s 
hope for the public intellectual is that their voice and input will motivate an engaged 
citizenry ‘towards the ideal of a talking public’ (2002, p. 9).
While a talking public is a defining characteristic of deliberative democracy, the full 
realisation of effective government as an operational ideal assumes that the talk engaged 
in by the relevant public should be based on informed comment and opinion rather than 
fake news (Farkas & Schou, 2019; McKay & Tenove, 2020), flaky politics, unruly speakers 
and fractured publics. It is in these circumstances that the reputable, but legacy media 
institutions of western democracies may operate as honest brokers (Edwards, 2001; 
Livingstone & Lunt, 1994) in identifying fact from fiction (Schwalbe, Silcock, & 
Candello, 2015); elevating some opinions while casting doubt (or scorn) upon others 
(Munson & Resnick, 2010; Schnell, 2001). While younger social media-infused publics 
may find this role problematic, in that it can seem stuffy, elitist and even somewhat anti- 
democratic (Fuchs, 2013; McChesney, 2016), the circulation of legacy media-curated 
comment on and by social media (Newman, 2011; Tsagkias, De Rijke, & Weerkamp, 
2011) means that such legacy institutions continue to have relevance across generations 
and without regard to platform. Accordingly, younger citizens may tacitly accept that 
public intellectuals have a role to play while simultaneously resisting the sense of an 
entitlement to speak conferred upon them by the legacy media.
But can a non-intellectual really be termed a public intellectual? And, if not, what role 
does such an individual play? Drezner (2017) argues against an ideal whereby democratic 
engagement is positioned as the particular purview of the public intellectual. He suggests 
that the ‘traditional public intellectual’ is more ‘ready to explain why some new policy 
idea is unlikely to work’ (2017, p. 101) than they are to promote a positive vision for the 
future. This conception of the public intellectual is one that operates in critique, a voice 
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that teases out possibilities and consequences, likely fact and probable fiction, from the 
suggestions that circulate in the political domain. Drezner (2017) identifies a need for 
a more proactive role then ‘critic’. He assigns that role to a group of people whom he 
terms ‘thought leaders’. Drezner’s view is that these citizens should have a ‘positive idea 
for change and the conviction that they can make a difference’ (p. 101). This positioning 
of the thought leader returns the paper to Margaret Mead’s ‘small group of thoughtful, 
committed citizens [who] can change the world’. Ultimately, to be a member of Mead’s 
group, someone needs to have a belief in their capacity to make a difference and the 
confidence that they know the difference to be made. Drezner (2017) recognises a role for 
both elements of the public intellectual/thought leader duo whereby thought leaders 
produce new ideas that have the capacity to excite and energise others as to the potential 
for change, and public intellectuals analyse and critique those ideas.
Greta Thunberg, in her much-repeated injunction ‘listen to the scientists’ (Milman & 
Smith, 2019) provides an example of a thought leader who champions knowledge. Her 
acknowledgement that she knows that something is wrong, and knows whom she trusts to 
have the best path forward in addressing that wrong, establishes her as a thought leader who is 
pointing her generation to respect the work of experts in the relevant fields. But Thunberg is 
more than a touchstone for a generation. Thunberg harnesses a range of publics who seek to 
pressure government (and industry, and the financial markets) to develop policies to respect 
core, informed, evidence-based knowledge as the underpinning impetus for public action and 
decision-making. She does this through using the power of her individual voice to link with 
and influence generations beyond her own. One of Thunberg’s strategies for achieving this 
goal is in communicating with established public intellectuals that already have cut-through 
voices in their own right, with their own key publics. David Attenborough and Jane Goodall 
are appropriate examples of such people, but Thunberg also aligns herself as being against the 
‘enemies’ of her cause, showing herself to be more than a match for an intellectual contest 
with past President of the United States, Donald Trump. Thunberg’s thought leadership 
aligns her with key public intellectuals, and against enemies of knowledge, while her words 
communicate authoritatively across generations, cultures and contexts.
Thunberg is offered as a shining exemplar of the continuing power of the individual 
voice communicating across time and space regardless of the disruption caused by unruly 
speakers and publics. Too young to vote at an age where she galvanised millions around the 
globe, few thought leaders in history have achieved the impact Thunberg enabled through 
the power of hyperconnected media. She sparks the imaginations of those who champion 
the role of knowledge in helping the world work through a series of existence-limiting 
challenges. The contribution made by Thunberg and her audiences continues to inform 
political processes in the world’s deliberative democracies (Devaney et al., 2020). With luck, 
the impact of Thunberg’s ideas will mean that her generation is not the last one to 
repurpose old terms for new circumstances.
Conclusion
This paper has suggested the importance both of public intellectuals and thought 
leaders in illuminating the role played by the individual voice in providing continuity 
at a time when the open communication of research is disrupted by unruly speakers 
and publics.
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The synthesis of these two roles allows for the refinement of possibilities and the 
nuanced development of ways forward that strengthen the operation of deliberative 
democracies. Such a dynamic helps identify key priorities while making the actions of 
an engaged citizenry more relevant and effective. This complementarity of thought 
leaders with public intellectuals potentially serves as the yin and yang of what might be 
termed the role of knowledge championship. Together and separately the thought leader 
and public intellectual produce and promote knowledge, but in different ways, using 
complementary and mutually beneficial starting points. In effect knowledge champions, 
as represented in the work of thought leaders and public intellectuals, provide examples 
of continuity around the power of the individual voice to make a difference to the 
societies in which they live. They do this work in defiance of disruption by unruly publics 
and speakers. Arguably open science, and society-wide access to the fruits of knowledge, 
support the rise of knowledge championship in promoting an alignment between the 
direction in which society is moving and the one that science has identified as being 
beneficial.
The ‘small group of thoughtful, committed citizens’ championed by Mead do 
offer a vision of continuity over time, proving the power of the individual voice and 
vision to change the world, one argument at a time, society by society in 
a hyperconnected globe. As a dynamic underpinning, Dahlgren (2002, 2009) 
advances a model for a civic cultures framework. This second model has six over-
lapping, inter-related dimensions: identities; knowledge; practices; spaces; trust, and 
values (paraphrasing and essentialising Dahlgren, 2009, p. 123). These dimensions 
are arranged here in alphabetical order, which puts the element ‘identities’ first, 
which has the added benefit of reflecting Dahlgren’s positioning of that aspect of 
civic engagement as being the most important one. Dahlgren conceptualises iden-
tities as interacting with knowledge, practices, spaces, trust and values to create the 
framework within which ideas circulate through and across societies.
One possible reason why identities are elevated in Dahlgren’s framework is that they 
are developed and informed in interaction with the ideas circulated through culture by 
the dual agency of public intellectuals and thought leaders. Socially engaged knowledge 
champions potentially motivate individual engagement with complex arguments, 
prompting the discussion of ideas within and between social and political networks. 
This work of the knowledge champion becomes especially crucial in an era of fake news, 
flaky politics, unruly speakers and fractured publics. That’s because the knowledge 
champion’s lone voice gives an opportunity for people to cut through the clutter and 
see clearly what it is that needs to be discussed; what it is that needs to be prioritised, what 
it is that needs to be considered at a time of change. Further, the open communication of 
science improves the possibility that the discussion will proceed in an evidence-based 
direction.
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